## Aff answers

### Perm solves the NATO Cohesion DA

#### Perm provides new cooperation opportunity for NATO unity – solves the DA

**Binnendijk,**  Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council **and Hamilton** Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe**, 2022**

**[**Hans and Daniel, “Strategic Responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense” Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/> GDI-TM]

To achieve these two strategic goals, NATO allies could agree within the NATO Defense Planning Process to a military level of ambition for European strategic responsibility. European allies and Canada could commit to investing sufficient resources to ensure that, by the end of the decade, they can meet 50% of NATO’s Minimum Capability Requirements. This would mean fully usable forces required to cover the whole spectrum of operations and missions, as well as the strategic enablers needed to conduct multiple large- and small-scale missions — if necessary, without U.S. support.

Meeting this standard will take time, given Europe’s current lack of enablers, its relatively low readiness rates, and its fragmented military industrial complex. Building European strategic responsibility will be a process, not a one-time event. At Madrid, alliance leaders will unveil NATO’s new Strategic Concept, its first in 12 years. The Strategic Concept should launch the process toward greater European strategic responsibility, reinforced by complementary efforts to implement the EU’s Strategic Compass.

Greater European strategic responsibility will require more, not less, trans-Atlantic consultation on political-military matters. When Europe acquires the military capabilities needed to exercise real strategic responsibility, its political voice will be amplified. Diplomatic differences between the United States and Europe will still arise, but a dialogue among equals is more likely to overcome areas of disagreement. That said, new mechanisms for NATO-EU coordination will be needed.

### Non-unique – dependent on the US now

#### Ukraine conflict increased dependence on the US

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Vladimir Putin’s greatest achievement thus far in renewing his brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine has been to reinvigorate the Atlantic alliance. North American-European unity has been remarkable, exemplified by harsh and complementary sanctions against Russia; efforts to wean Europe off its dangerous dependence on Russian energy; military, financial, and political support for Ukraine; and actions to strengthen NATO’s own defense.

A more corrosive effect of Putin’s war, however, has been to deepen even further Europe’s strategic dependence on the United States — a trend that had already become unsustainable even before the conflict began. As the alliance continues its most urgent task — helping Ukraine beat back Russia’s assault — it must address this important longer-term challenge of rebalancing trans-Atlantic defense.

Doing so means squaring a triangle of issues: ensuring Europe’s capacity to defend itself against Russia and manage a range of additional crises, many along its southern periphery; addressing European aspirations for greater strategic autonomy; and maintaining confidence that the United States can adequately uphold its commitments in both the north Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.